AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security

Modern open-world agents such as OpenClaw exhibit powerful cross-environment execution capabilities yet introduce broad new safety risk sources. Meanwhile, advanced frontier AI models drastically lower attack barriers, rendering current agent alignment frameworks inadequate for real-world deployment. To tackle these emerging threats, we propose a lightweight and scalable agent safety alignment framework. Specifically, we update the agent safety taxonomy to accommodate emergent risks from Codex and OpenClaw execution scenarios. We further build a taxonomy-guided data engine with influence-function purification to train lightweight AgentDoG 1.5 variants (0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 8B parameters) using only around 1k samples, achieving comparable performance with leading closed-source models (e.g., GPT-5.4). Based on AgentDoG 1.5, we construct a highly efficient agentic safety SFT and RL training environment, which reduces deployment overhead in Docker-level environments by two orders of magnitude. Finally, we deploy AgentDoG 1.5 as a training-free online guardrail for real-time safety moderation. Extensive experimental results indicate that AgentDoG 1.5 achieves state-of-the-art performance in diverse and complex interactive agentic scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.

RouteScan: A Non-Intrusive Approach to Auditing MoE LLMs Safety via Expert Routing Telemetry

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures have become an increasingly important paradigm for scaling Large Language Models (LLMs). As MoE models are increasingly deployed in real-world services, safety auditing becomes necessary to verify whether these models produce or facilitate harmful behaviors during operation. However, existing content-based auditing methods typically require access to user prompts, model inputs, or generated outputs, potentially exposing sensitive user information and creating a fundamental tension between LLM safety and user privacy. On the other hand, we observe that, in MoE models, sparse expert routing maps different inputs to activate different expert-execution patterns, producing measurable footprints in low-level GPU execution telemetry. Inspired by this observation, we propose RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework for detecting harmful behaviors through GPU-level expert routing telemetry. Specifically, RouteScan utilizes the number of active GPU threads allocated to expert modules during the prefilling phase as a discriminative micro-architectural fingerprint, and builds a lightweight detection pipeline that isolates cross-domain invariant risk indicators for the precise identification of malicious prompts. Comprehensive evaluations on open-source MoE LLMs with distinct routing designs demonstrate that RouteScan achieves strong generalization, with an AUROC exceeding 0.93 on unseen harmful domains and 0.96 under novel jailbreak wrappers. Moreover, empirical inversion tests show that the collected expert routing telemetry provides limited information for prompt reconstruction, suggesting a practical privacy advantage over content-based auditing methods.

Reasoning as an Attack Surface: Adaptive Evolutionary CoT Jailbreaks for LLMs

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in reasoning and generation tasks and are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. However, their explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) mechanism introduces new security risks, making them particularly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing approaches often rely on static CoT templates to elicit harmful outputs, but such fixed designs suffer from limited diversity, adaptability, and effectiveness. To overcome these limitations, we propose an adaptive evolutionary CoT jailbreak framework, called AE-CoT. Specifically, the method first rewrites harmful goals into mild prompts with teacher role-play and decomposes them into semantically coherent reasoning fragments to construct a pool of CoT jailbreak candidates. Then, within a structured representation space, we perform multi-generation evolutionary search, where candidate diversity is expanded through fragment-level crossover and a mutation strategy with an adaptive mutation-rate control mechanism. An independent scoring model provides graded harmfulness evaluations, and high-scoring candidates are further enhanced with a harmful CoT template to induce more destructive generations. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed AE-CoT, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art jailbreak methods.

Unveiling the Backdoor Mechanism Hidden Behind Catastrophic Overfitting in Fast Adversarial Training

Fast Adversarial Training (FAT) has attracted significant attention due to its efficiency in enhancing neural network robustness against adversarial attacks. However, FAT is prone to catastrophic overfitting (CO), wherein models overfit to the specific attack used during training and fail to generalize to others. While existing methods introduce diverse hypotheses and propose various strategies to mitigate CO, a systematic and intuitive explanation of CO remains absent. In this work, we innovatively interpret CO through the lens of backdoor. Through validations on pathway division, diverse feature predictions, and universal class distinguishable triggers in CO, we conceptualize CO as a weak trigger variant of unlearnable tasks, unifying CO, backdoor attacks, and unlearnable tasks under a common theoretical framework. Guided by this, we leverage several backdoor inspired strategies to mitigate CO: (i) Recalibrate CO affected model parameters using vanilla fine tuning, linear probing, or reinitialization-based techniques; (ii) Introduce a weight outlier suppression constraint to regulate abnormal deviations in model weights. Extensive experiments support our interpretation of CO and show the efficacy of the proposed mitigation strategies.

Mitigating Error Amplification in Fast Adversarial Training

Fast Adversarial Training (FAT) has proven effective in enhancing model robustness by encouraging networks to learn perturbation-invariant representations. However, FAT often suffers from catastrophic overfitting (CO), where the model overfits to the training attack and fails to generalize to unseen ones. Moreover, robustness oriented optimization typically leads to notable performance degradation on clean inputs, and such degradation becomes increasingly severe as the perturbation budget grows. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of how guidance strength affects model performance by modulating perturbation and supervision levels across distinct confidence groups. The findings reveal that low confidence samples are the primary contributors to CO and the robustness accuracy trade off. Building on this insight, we propose a Distribution-aware Dynamic Guidance (DDG) strategy that dynamically adjusts both the perturbation budget and supervision signal. Specifically, DDG scales the perturbation magnitude according to the sample confidence at the ground truth class, thereby guiding samples toward consistent decision boundaries while mitigating the influence of learning spurious correlations. Simultaneously, it dynamically adjusts the supervision signal based on the prediction state of each sample, preventing overemphasis on incorrect signals. To alleviate potential gradient instability arising from dynamic guidance, we further design a weighted regularization constraint. Extensive experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that DDG effectively alleviates both CO and the robustness accuracy trade off.

Accelerating Suffix Jailbreak attacks with Prefix-Shared KV-cache

Suffix jailbreak attacks serve as a systematic method for red-teaming Large Language Models (LLMs) but suffer from prohibitive computational costs, as a large number of candidate suffixes need to be evaluated before identifying a jailbreak suffix. This paper presents Prefix-Shared KV Cache (PSKV), a plug-and-play inference optimization technique tailored for jailbreak suffix generation. Our method is motivated by a key observation that when performing suffix jailbreaking, while a large number of candidate prompts need to be evaluated, they share the same targeted harmful instruction as the prefix. Therefore, instead of performing redundant inference on the duplicated prefix, PSKV maintains a single KV cache for this prefix and shares it with every candidate prompt, enabling the parallel inference of diverse suffixes with minimal memory overhead. This design enables more aggressive batching strategies that would otherwise be limited by memory constraints. Extensive experiments on six widely used suffix attacks across five widely deployed LLMs demonstrate that PSKV reduces inference time by 40\% and peak memory usage by 50\%, while maintaining the original Attack Success Rate (ASR). The code has been submitted and will be released publicly.

MAGIC: A Co-Evolving Attacker-Defender Adversarial Game for Robust LLM Safety

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their \textbf{reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions}. In this paper, we introduce \textbf{MAGIC}, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a \textbf{co-evolution}, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves \textbf{novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies} through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

Attack-Resistant Watermarking for AIGC Image Forensics via Diffusion-based Semantic Deflection

Protecting the copyright of user-generated AI images is an emerging challenge as AIGC becomes pervasive in creative workflows. Existing watermarking methods (1) remain vulnerable to real-world adversarial threats, often forced to trade off between defenses against spoofing and removal attacks; and (2) cannot support semantic-level tamper localization. We introduce PAI, a training-free inherent watermarking framework for AIGC copyright protection, plug-and-play with diffusion-based AIGC services. PAI simultaneously provides three key functionalities: robust ownership verification, attack detection, and semantic-level tampering localization. Unlike existing inherent watermark methods that only embed watermarks at noise initialization of diffusion models, we design a novel key-conditioned deflection mechanism that subtly steers the denoising trajectory according to the user key. Such trajectory-level coupling further strengthens the semantic entanglement of identity and content, thereby further enhancing robustness against real-world threats. Moreover, we also provide a theoretical analysis proving that only the valid key can pass verification. Experiments across 12 attack methods show that PAI achieves 98.43\% verification accuracy, improving over SOTA methods by 37.25\% on average, and retains strong tampering localization performance even against advanced AIGC edits. Our code is available at https://github.com/QingyuLiu/PAI.

DualBreach: Efficient Dual-Jailbreaking via Target-Driven Initialization and Multi-Target Optimization

Recent research has focused on exploring the vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), aiming to elicit harmful and/or sensitive content from LLMs. However, due to the insufficient research on dual-jailbreaking -- attacks targeting both LLMs and Guardrails, the effectiveness of existing attacks is limited when attempting to bypass safety-aligned LLMs shielded by guardrails. Therefore, in this paper, we propose DualBreach, a target-driven framework for dual-jailbreaking. DualBreach employs a Target-driven Initialization (TDI) strategy to dynamically construct initial prompts, combined with a Multi-Target Optimization (MTO) method that utilizes approximate gradients to jointly adapt the prompts across guardrails and LLMs, which can simultaneously save the number of queries and achieve a high dual-jailbreaking success rate. For black-box guardrails, DualBreach either employs a powerful open-sourced guardrail or imitates the target black-box guardrail by training a proxy model, to incorporate guardrails into the MTO process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DualBreach in dual-jailbreaking scenarios through extensive evaluation on several widely-used datasets. Experimental results indicate that DualBreach outperforms state-of-the-art methods with fewer queries, achieving significantly higher success rates across all settings. More specifically, DualBreach achieves an average dual-jailbreaking success rate of 93.67% against GPT-4 with Llama-Guard-3 protection, whereas the best success rate achieved by other methods is 88.33%. Moreover, DualBreach only uses an average of 1.77 queries per successful dual-jailbreak, outperforming other state-of-the-art methods. For the purpose of defense, we propose an XGBoost-based ensemble defensive mechanism named EGuard, which integrates the strengths of multiple guardrails, demonstrating superior performance compared with Llama-Guard-3.

Nearly Optimal Differentially Private ReLU Regression

In this paper, we investigate one of the most fundamental nonconvex learning problems, ReLU regression, in the Differential Privacy (DP) model. Previous studies on private ReLU regression heavily rely on stringent assumptions, such as constant bounded norms for feature vectors and labels. We relax these assumptions to a more standard setting, where data can be i.i.d. sampled from $O(1)$-sub-Gaussian distributions. We first show that when $\varepsilon = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\frac{1}{N}})$ and there is some public data, it is possible to achieve an upper bound of $\Tilde{O}(\frac{d^2}{N^2 \varepsilon^2})$ for the excess population risk in $(\epsilon, \delta)$-DP, where $d$ is the dimension and $N$ is the number of data samples. Moreover, we relax the requirement of $\epsilon$ and public data by proposing and analyzing a one-pass mini-batch Generalized Linear Model Perceptron algorithm (DP-MBGLMtron). Additionally, using the tracing attack argument technique, we demonstrate that the minimax rate of the estimation error for $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP algorithms is lower bounded by $\Omega(\frac{d^2}{N^2 \varepsilon^2})$. This shows that DP-MBGLMtron achieves the optimal utility bound up to logarithmic factors. Experiments further support our theoretical results.